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Offensive Speech and the FCC
The Federal Communications Commission, the Congress and the
public have demonstrated increasing concern with what is loosely
called obscene broadcasting. Three of the most controversial pro-
-rams of this kind were carried over stations licensed to the Pacifica
Foundation. Pacifica's Los Angeles station broadcast a poem, "Jeho-
vah's Child," which began, "In Christ's name, kindness is sucking the
cock/of a turned cheek-Jesus style-Jehovah would have bitten it
off."' Controversy followed, as it did in two other publicized inci-
dents.2 As a result, many have urged that the Foundation be punished
for airing these programs; complaints to the FCC allege sacrilege,
pornography, obscenity, blasphemy and vulgarity.3 FCC Chairman
1. The poem was originally presented in an adult education English class at Los
Angeles Valley College. The class's teacher and the poet involved, also a teacher, had
been fired by the college for their activities; a vociferous controversy ensued. Station
KPFK-FM, of which Pacifica is the licensee, broadcast a panel discussion of local critics
to consider the poem and the issue of academic freedom that it raised. Throughout the
day of the broadcast, listeners were -warned that the poem would be read and discussed at
10:30 p.m., that many would find it offensive, and that the poem had been published
and could be read in the Los Angeles Free Press issue of a month before. The entire
poem was printed in a statement by Commissioner Robert E. Lee, dissenting from the
grant of a construction permit for a Pacifica station in Houston. News Release Report
No. 8593, Broadcast Action, October 31, 1969.
2. In New York, a black high school teacher read a poem dedicated to Albert Shan-
ker, President of the United Federation of Teachers, that began "Hey Jew Boy. with
that yamulka [sic] on your head. You pale faced Jew boy-I wish you were dead." The
poem, entitled "Anti-Semitism," is published in Dan Sanders, 17 F.C.C. 2d 204, 15
P & F RADio RFG. 2d 1069 (1969). It was written by a young black student, and read
by her teacher, Leslie Campbell, on WBAI-FM's Julius Lester Show. In San Francis o.
a live broadcast of the Black Panther Conference on Fascism included a characterization
of Richard Nixon as a "mother-fucker." "United Front Against Fascism" series, spon-
sored by the Black Panther Party, in Oakland Auditorium in August, 1969, broadcast
on KPFA-FM on November 22, 1969.
3. The FCC reduces all complaints to writing and forwards them to the station
licensee with a form letter which includes the following paragraph:
Since it is the practice of the Commission to associate complaints with its files on
the licensees involved and to afford them the opportunity to comment thereon, it is
requested that you submit a statement concerning the above matter.
The FCC does not screen the complaints before demanding an explanation; nor does
it consider whether it has the power to remedy a complaint should the complaint be
unanswerable. See Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10
J. LAw & ECON. 15, 21 (1967).
During 1968-69, the Commission received about one complaint of obscenity, vulgarity or
profanity every six weeks against all four of the Pacifica stations (WBAI-FM in New York,
KPFK-FM in Los Angeles, KPFA-FM and KPFB-rhf in Berkeley, California). Over a three
month period during 1969, 147 complaints were filed against stations owned by or affiliated
with CBS and NBC. Letter to Senator Pastore from Commissioner Kenneth Cox, Decem-
ber 23, 1969, printed in Hearings on S. 2004 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of
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Dean Burch has recently warned that "obscene programming is a
form of air pollution that could become as serious a problem as
smog."4
Under the theory which currently justifies broadcast regulation, gov-
ernmental power over this type of programming-which may be la-
belled quasi-obscene or offensiver-is virtually unlimited. Attempts
to exercise this power raise important free speech questions which
the current theory of regulation ignores. A governmental role may
be appropriate in the broadcast industry, but it should be a carefully
limited one. After delineating the failings of the current approach
to governmental regulation, this Note suggests a set of First Amend-
ment standards for determining the validity of FCC action in the
area of offensive speech.
I. The "Public Interest Theory" of FCC Regulation and the First
Amendment
The current extent of the government's role in regulating the broad-
cast media is an anomaly in a system of free expression.0 Government
has traditionally been prohibited from interfering with expression of
ideas because it might seek to mold public opinion in order to main-
tain and augment its own power. The prohibition is a strong one: even
when those in power are convinced that substantial harm may result
from allowing private parties to speak unmolested, their hands may
be tied.7 As the Supreme Court recently demonstrated in New York
Times v. Sullivan," even seditious libel, a form of speech traditionally
abhorred by all governments, is protected.9 The prohibition on gov-
the Senate Commerce Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 354 (1969) [herelnafter dted
as Hearings on S. 2004].
4. San Francisco Chronicle, January 10, 1970, at 2, col. 5. Increased interest in offensive
programming is also indicated by the Federal Communications Bar Association's panel
discussion on "Sex, Dirty Words and Mass Media," held June 13, 1970 In Williamsburg,
Virginia.
5. Quasi-obscene or offensive, as used herein, refers to speech which does not meet thejudicial definition of obscenity.
6. For discussion of the background of the First Amendment, see Z. CHAFEE, FREr.
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); T. EMERSON, TiE SYSTEM oF FaREEIoM OF EXP, ssIoNt
(1970); L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
7. Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. Ci. L. REV. 461 (1953).
8. 376 US 254, 273, 276 (1964).
9. The Court did not simply, in the face of an awkward history, definitively put to
rest the status of the Sedition Act. More important, it found in the controversy over
seditious libel the clue to "the central meaning of the First Amendment." The cholce
of language was unusually apt. The Amendment has a "central meaning"-a core of
protection of speech without which democracy cannot function, without which, In
Madison's phrase, "the censorial power" would be in the Government over the people
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ernmental regulation of the system of expression is justified by a
market theory of communications. Private parties are conceived as
vigorously competing with each other and with government in a "free
market place" of ideas; those ideas with the greatest truth value should
ultimately receive general public acceptance.
If the hypothesized market is to operate effectively, there must be
easy access to the means of communication so that diverse viewpoints
can be presented. But ownership of the effective means of communica-
tion-TV, radio, magazines and large circulation newspapers-is now
dosed to all but a few. The small private groups that control the
broadcast media do not present the multitude of opinions that exist in
America today.10 The vast majority of citizens are without access to the
media and thus are effectively denied the opportunity to control the
communication of their views. The free market of ideas in broadcast-
ing is grossly imperfect.
The programming results of concentrated ownership are almost uni-
versally condemned, albeit for various reasons." But critics unite in
demanding that government do something. Thus, from the failure of
the market in the broadcast media comes a "public interest theory"
which provides government with an extraordinary role in the area
of broadcast regulation.
The "public interest theory" has its origins in the language of the
Communications Act of 1934. Owing to technological scarcity of spec-
and not "in the people over the Government." This is not the whole meaning d the
Amendment. There are other freedoms protected by it. But at the center there is no
doubt what speech is being protected and no doubt why it is being protected. The
theory of the freedom of speech clause was put right side up for the first time.
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Afeaning of the First Amend-
ment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191, 208.
10. See pp. 1351-53.
11. Some consider television bland and unstimulating. See, e.g., C. SoPrN, SEVEN
GLORIous DAYS, SEVEN FUN-FI..ET NIoHTs (1969) (author watched TV in lonely N.Y.
room for one week straight); N. MiNow, EQUAL TIME 52 (1964) ("you will see a vast
wasteland'). See also THE MASON WLLIAMs F.C.C. RAPPORT (1969):
Network television wants to keep you stupid so you'll watch it . . . .Television is
doing to your mind exactly what industry is doing to the land. Some people al-
ready think like New York City looks.
Id. at 100, 110.
Others criticize programming as violent and corrupt. See Hearings on Review of
Policy Matters of FCC and Inquiry Into Crime and Violence on Television and a Pro-
posed Study Thereof By the Surgeon General Before the Subcommittee on Conunica-
tions of the Senate Commerce Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 335-338 (Sen.
Pastore), 358-359 (Sen. Pearson), 421-422 (Sen. Houtke) (1969). (Hereinafter cited as
Pastore Hearings on Violence.) See also NATIONAL COMM N. ON THE CAUSEs AND PMtVN-
TION OF VioLENCE, To EsrALisH JusTICE, To INsuP DomEsrTic TRANQUILLITY 80.82, 187-207
(1969) (Final Report).
12. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1964) include most of the statutes dealing vith radio and
television.
1345
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 79: 1343, 1970
tram space for broadcasting, the FCC was authorized to license broad-
casters in ways which promote the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity."'13 In making licensing decisions under the statute, the FCC
can choose between competing applicants on the basis of program-
ming;14 it may reject a sole applicant for a particular frequency if his
program plans appear inadequate.' 5 The Commission thus uses its li-
censing authority to exercise a measure of control over broadcast pro-
gramming. The test applied by the Commission-conformity to "the
public interest"--has never been clearly defined. For example, Senator
Pastore described "the public interest" as it affects programming in a
colloquy with the members of the FCC who appeared before the Sen-
ate Sub-Committee on Communications, which he chairs:
The question is, are they [the programs] serving the public
interest? . . . That is a mandate under the law and when you sit
there and when you tell me you find it offensive; you find it
obnoxious; you find it in bad taste; well, how then can you say
you are serving the public interest and give the man a license?
What is in the public interest is the lifting up of morals and the
spirits of our people ... If we do things that are in the gutter
and we use language that is gutter language and we talk about
the deity in perversion, how in the name of Heaven can we say
that we are serving the public interest.'
Pastore's remarks suggest that the term "public interest," as used in
the broadcast setting, is a highly subjective concept, a repository for
competing values, prejudices, and beliefs.
The "public interest theory" treats the First Amendment as an in-
teresting parallel development in other media. The Commission has
never said that the free speech clause does not apply to broadcast
regulation.'7 But since it believes that radio and TV-because of their
special nature-must be regulated for the benefit of the whole public,
the First Amendment rights of broadcasters are only one of many "fac-
tors" in a public interest finding and should not be accorded a pre-
ferred position as are the rights of communicators in other media.
13. 47 US.C. § 307 (1964). See 47 U.S.C. § 807(a) (d) and § 809(a), covering both the
initial grant and subsequent renewals of broadcast licenses.
14. Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
15. Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
16. Hearings on S. 2004, supra, note 4, at 373.
17. The Communications Act, 47 US.C. § 326 (1964) states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio
station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Com-
mission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio cotn-
munication.
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These rights can, on occasion, be ignored, if they interfere with FCC
efforts to "improve" broadcasting for the entire public.18
Operating under the "public interest theory," the government has
established a variety of laws and regulations that directly or indirectly
affect the content of broadcasting.19 Some of these rules affect incen-
tive structures for broadcast ownership and hence influence who own-
ers will be. Examples include taxes, zoning regulations, minimum
wage laws and labor legislation. Other laws directly prohibit certain
people from owning a particular broadcast facility. The anti-trust laws
are one example;20 so is the FCC's recently promulgated "one-to-a-
customer" rule.2' It should be recognized that these laws, which affect
who broadcast owners will be, also affect program content to a degree.
A pre-1965 FCC rule required broadcast applicants to include as
part of their applications the percentage of programming that would
be devoted to a number of different program categories. -2 Renewal
18. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 31-38.
19. For description and comment on FCC program regulation, see inter alia, Robinson,
The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television
Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967); The FCC's Role in Television Programming
Regulation-A Symposium, 14 Vit. L. REv. 581 (1969); Comment, Television Service and
the FCC, 46 TkxAs L. REv. 1100 (1968); Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC,
77 Hsnv. L. REV. 701 (1964).
20. The antitrust laws apply to broadcasting. United States v. RCA, 358 US. 334 (1959).
Report on Chain Broadcasting, quoted in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 223 (1943).
21. The rule provides that within five years present broadcast owners will be required
to reduce holdings in a single community to one mass medium (newspaper, radio,
UHF-TV). Several kinds of facilities are excepted, including UHF-TV. N.Y. Times,
March 27, 1970, at p. 1, col. 7. For background, see Notice of Proposed Rule-making-Mul-
tiple Ownership, 12 F.C.C. 2d 912, 13 P. & F. RAro Rr. 2d 1526 (1968).
22. Commission Policy on Programming, 20 P & F RAimo Rrc. 1901, 1913 (1960). Pro-
gram balance is discussed in the articles and notes cited supra, note 19. The pre-1965
categories were entertainment, education, religion, agriculture, news, discussion, talk
(including sports) and other. In 1965 the FCC eliminated all but the following three
program categories for applications and renewals: news, public affairs and other pro-
gramming excluding entertainment and sports. The Commission's current stated policy
is that the applicant inform himself of the needs and interests of the listeners through
such means as interviews and surveys. From the information gathered, the broadcaster
is to formulate some programming that will contribute to community betterment. The
broadcaster is not however required to formulate his programming according to com-
munity programming preferences. There is some confusion among broadcasters about
what kind of information they should obtain from the surveys and interviews and what
use they are required to make of the information derived.
License applicants are asked to submit proposals showing the percentage of planned
programming in various categories, and licensees are required to maintain program logs
from which they prepare a "composite week" of broadcasting to be submitted with their
renewal application. Although the FCC does not formally enforce a fixed standard of bal-
ance, it is evident that certain classifications are looked upon with more approval than
others. To assure success on license applications and renewals, broadcasters in general
conform to the FCC "approved" standards of balance.
A related policy was recently announced; television stations are now required to air one
prime time hour (7 to 11 p.m.) of non-network produced material each night. N.Y. Times,
May 8, 1970, at p. 1, coL 1. This effort to stimulate diversity of program source was not
mentioned in the text because some Commissioners began predicting revision of the rule as
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applications required a breakdown of the percentage of programming
actually devoted to each of these categories in a composite week. This
requirement resulted in most broadcasters devoting similar amounts
of broadcasting time to each of the named categories to meet their con-
ception of what the Commission wanted. Here the government was
in effect choosing minimum time for news, agriculture and religion
rather than, for example, athletics, classical music, movies, and quiz
shows. Through this so-called program balance, the FCC was impos-
ing its viewpoint by limiting the private owner's choice of program
categories.
Another FCC rule requires that equal air time be offered to each
political candidate. 23 This amounts to direct interference with program
content. The government requires a particular response-provision of
time for opposing candidates-after the broadcaster allows one can-
didate to appear on the air.24
A similar rule, but one of much greater significance for program
content, is the fairness doctrine, which imposes an obligation on the
broadcaster to present "contrasting responsible points of view" on
"controversial issues" of "public importance." 25 The duty is not to
grant equal time to all opposing viewpoints, but to insure "fair treat-
ment" to the various sides "over a reasonable period of time." When
it is necessary to grant time under the fairness doctrine, the station
must give those representing opposing views free time if they are un-
willing to pay for it.26
soon as the rule was announced. The new rule is the product of a rule-making proceeding
which has been conducted intermittently since 1965. See Proposed FCC Beg. 30 FED. Rr.
4065 (1965) and 34 FED. REG. 14,470 (1969).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1964).
24. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 128-131; Singer, The FCC and Equal Time: Never
Neverland Revisited, 27 MD. L. Rav. 221 (1967); Note, Radio and Television Appearances of
Candidates for Offices, 69 YALE L.J. 805 (1960).
The statute does not require that candidates be allowed air time, but only that they be
treated equally. John B. Crommelin, 19 P & F RADIO RE. 1392 (1960). But see N.Y. Times,
March 20, 1970, at p. 7, col. 1, reporting that the Senate Commerce Committee approved fixed
low rates for candidates and abolished equal time for Presidential elections. The purpose
of this amendment to § 315(a) is to encourage free debates for Presidential candidates and
to cut costs for other candidates.
25. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 2 P & F RADiO REG. 2d 1901 (1964). The statutory authority for the
fairness doctrine is 47 U.S.C. § 315(a). Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 US. 867
(1969). For a description of the fairness doctrine, see Fairness Doctrine, Staff Report for the
Subcomm. on Communications, Senate Commerce Committee, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968).
For comments, compare Barron, In Defense of "Fairness": A First Amendment Rationalefor Broadcasting's "Fairness" Doctrine, 37 U. CoLo. L. REV. 31 (1964) and Barrow, The
Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrine in Broadcasting: Pillars in the Forum of
,Democracy, 37 U. CINN. L. REv. 447 (1968), in Robinson, supra note 19, at 131-136, and
Sullivan, Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster's Dilemma, 32 GEO. WAH. L. REv.
719 (1964).
26. The fairness doctrine and the personal attack rules were validated in Red Lion v.
FCC, 895 U.S. 367 (1969), discussed infra pp. 1354-57.
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Finally, the Commission, in many cases, punishes the licensee for
broadcasting a particular program. Some acts are forbidden by stat-
ute, such as presenting gambling information,27 perpetrating fraud,2 8
and broadcasting obscenity.29 Other acts are penalized30 because their
broadcast violated "the public interest"; dirty poems,3' suggestive
songs,3 2 tasteless jokes,33 defamation,34 unethical practice of medi-
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964). See, e.g. Broadcast of Horse Radng Information, 2 P & F
RADIo REG. 2d 1609 (1964); Community Broadcast Service, Inc. 13 P & F RADio REc. 179(1955); WRBL Radio Station, 2 F.C.C. 687 (1936). This and-gambling statute does not
reach give-away programs, FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954), but such
programs can be regulated under the public interest standard. See KWK Radio Inc., 34
'FCC 1039, 25 P & F RADio REG. 577 (1963). Cf., Melody Music, Inc. 2 F.C.C. 2d 958. 6 P & F
RADIo REG. 2d 973 (1966), rev'd on other grounds 345 F.9d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and
Eleven Ten Broadcasting, 52 F.C.C. 706, 22 P & F RADio REG. 699 (1962). See generally Note,
Federal Communications Commission: Control of "Deceptive Programming," 108 U. PA.
L REv. 868 (1960).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964) (fraud by wire, radio or television). See Commercial Adver-
tising Standards, I P & F RADio REG. 2d 1606 (1964). The FTC has primary regulatory
responsibility for the content of television and radio advertising. See generally Comment,
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005, 1019-27, 1063-1101 (1967); Note, Illusion or
Deception: The Use of "Props" and "Mock.ups" in Television Advertising, 72 YAIx LJ.
145 (1962).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1964) provides: "Whosoever utters any obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
The Commission believes that it has original jurisdiction to determine violations of this
statute. See Eastern Education Radio, 18 P & F RADIo REi. 2d 860 (1970); Palmetto Broad-
casting Co., 33 F.C.C. 259, 23 P & F RADio REG. 483 (1962), aff'd sub nor. Robinon v. FCC,
334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir., 1964), cert. denied 379 US. 843 (1964). Cf. FCC v. American Broad-
casting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 289 & n.7 (1954).
A violation of § 1464 is subject to a wide range of FCC sanctions. The Commission may
revoke a broadcast license for violation of § 1464, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1964), and tie
Commission may issue a cease and desist order for such violations, 47 U.S.C. § 312(b)(1964). The Commission also has authority to suspend the "license of any operator" who
transmits "superfluous radio communications or signals or communications containing
profane or obscene words, language or meaning .... " 47 U.S.C. § 903(m)(D) (1964). The
FCC can establish forfeiture liability of up to $10,000 for violations of § 1464, 47 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1)(E) (1964), but these forfeitures cannot be taken into account in any other pro-
ceeding (such as license renewal) until the forfeiture is paid, or liability is confirmed by
a United States District Court. 47 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1964). Most important of all is the
Commission's authority to refuse to renew the broadcast license, on the grounds that a
licensee who violates the obscenity statute is not serving the public interest. 47 U.S.C.
§ 307(d) (1964).
30. Since the licensee must come to the Commission every three years to have his
license renewed, penalize must be considered in the broad sense of any FCC action which
makes renewal less likely, or the license less secure. Thus a cease and desist order, or a
renewal for one year only, are penalties.
31. Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, 1 P & F RADiO REG. 2d 747 (1964). Although
the licenses were renewed, they were subsequently limited to one year's duration. 6 P & F
RADio RE. 2d 570 (1965).
32. WREC Broadcast Service, 10 P & F RADio Rim. 1323, 1351 (1955); Tampa Times Co.,
10 P & F RADIo RiE. 77, 121, 134 (1955).
33. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250, 23 P & F RADIO Rim. 483 (1962), af'd
sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 534 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843
(1964) (see pp. 1359-60 for discussion of this case); Mile High Stations, 28 F.C.C. 795, 20
P & F RADIO EG. 345 (1960).
34. Relevant cases are those involving religious or racial prejudice. The Federal Radio
Commission held such material defamatory in Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC,
62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). Cf. Schaeffer Radio Co.(FRC, Docket No. 5228, May 29, 1930). The Commission now treats charges of group libel
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cine,35 conflict of interest,30 and rigged quiz shows37 have all met with
FCC disapproval 38
These various regulations of content seem to raise First Amendment
issues. Senator Pastore, and many members of the FCC, would simply
assert that each regulation is in the public interest and resolve
any issue in that fashion. But other officials, lawyers, and academics
have attempted to justify the unusual treatment accorded the First
Amendment in broadcasting as opposed to other media. They have
articulated a much more sophisticated version of the "public interest
theory." This version isolates four distinct features of radio and TV
that do not exist in other media and uses them as justification: (1) the
airwaves are publicly owned, (2) use of the airwaves is a privilege,
which can be withdrawn if the broadcaster fails to serve the public
interest, (3) the technical scarcity of spectrum space requires govern-
ment control of access to radio and TV, and (4) radio and TV are so
uniquely powerful that unfettered control by a few private parties
poses a threat to the system of expression rather than guaranteeing its
efficiency.8 9
None of these propositions by itself explains why the First Amend-
ment should not receive full consideration in broadcasting. Public
ownership of the air-waves should be an argument for more, not less,
free expression, expression unfettered by private censorship or govern-
mental suppression. 40
and defamation as issues to which the fairness doctrine applies. See cases cited in note 91
infra.
35. WSCB, Inc., 2 FCC 293 (1936); KFKB Broadcasting Assoc. v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C.
Cir. 1931).
36. National Broadcasting Co. 14 F.C.C. 2d 713, 14 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 113 (1968)
(Chet Huntley's editorials on the Wholesome Meat Act of 1967); Gross Telecasting, Inc.
14 F.C.C. 2d 239, 13 P & F R..io REG. 2d 1067 (1968); Crowell-Collier Broadcasting
Corp., 14 F.C.C. 2d 358, 8 P & F RAmo REG. 2d 1080 (1966).
37. KWK Radio, Inc. 34 F.C.C. 1039, 25 P 9- F R~mo iG. 577 (1963); Eleven Ten
Broadcasting, 32 F.C.C. 706, 22 P & F RADIO REG. 699 (1962). Cf. Melody Music, Inc. 2
F.C.C. 2d 958, 6 P & F RADlO REG. 2d 973 (1964), rev'd 345 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
38. Another large area which the FCC investigates is alleged slanting, distorting or
managing of news. Recent examples include National Broadcasting Co., 20 F.C.C. 2d 644,
17 P & F RArno REG. 2d 1089 (1969) (NBC eavesdropped on a private meeting at the Demo.
cratic National Convention in 1968); Columbia Broadcasting System, 17 P & F RADIo URa.
2d 843 (1969) (CBS documentary on the Poor People's Campaign); CBS Program "Hunger
in America," 20 F.C.C. 2d 143, 17 P &6 F RADIo REG. 2d 674 (1969) (CBS documentary);
WBBM-TV 18 F.C.C. 2d 124, 16 P & F Radio REG. 2d 207 (1969) (staged pot party for
documentary on university life); Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 16 F.C.C. 2d 882, 15 P SL F
RADmo RFG. 2d 993 (1969) (slanting of news to further interests of parent company); com-
plaints of mislabeling of news film against WPIX in New York, N.Y. Times, October 24,
1969, at p. 95, col. 1.
39. These features are discussed critically in Robinson, supra note 19, at 151-156.
40. Comment, Television, Service and the FCC, 46 TE ss L. REv. 1100, 1190 (1968). See
Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L. REv. 701, 713 (1964).
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Similarly, calling the broadcaster's position a privilege rather than a
right, asserting that he is in a preferred economic position because
of government largesse, or designating him a "trustee" of the public are
convenient phrases to use once one has decided that broadcasters have
limited First Amendment rights.
The third argument, that technical scarcity necessitates government
licensing of broadcast facilities, does not compel the conclusion that
program content may be regulated. In fact, the most obvious argument
is directly to the contrary: where a degree of control is necessitated in
the exercise of administrative licensing power, the courts should scruti-
nize such licensing activities with particular care to ensure that they are
not used to override First Amendment values.
The final argument-that radio and TV have a uniquely powerful
impact and that media owners operate in an imperfect competitive
market-is the central pillar of the "public interest theory," as has
been suggested; it has provided a rationale for government regulation
which has been widely endorsed for the nearly forty years of FCC his-
tory. Broadcasting, according to this argument, is the most influential
medium for communicating ideas and shaping consciousness that has
ever existed. Its message is dramatic and immediate;41 virtually every-
one has access to a television and radio.42 Political elections are won
and lost on television; a "media blackout," or even poor coverage,
makes election to important offices virtually impossible for the vic-
tim.4 3 Radio and TV are also the prime instruments for manipulating
consumer demand."
In the United States this power over politicians, consumer items and
many other aspects of life rests with a few station owners and network
officials who decide what is to be shown or heard and what is to be
suppresseL 45 With a few exceptions, the small controlling group pur-
41. A. HoFFMAN, REvOLuTION FOR TE HELM OF IT 79-80 (paper ed., 1963); H. M.
McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 268-294 (paper ed., 1964); Kelly, Second Edition/Who
Owns the Air?, THE CENT iAGAZINE, Volume III No. 2, 27 (1970).
42. Ninety.five per cent of all the households in the United States have a IV set:
about one quarter have more than one. Tr.axvisioN FAcrnoon 72-a (1969).
43. See generally J. McGumxss, TnE SELLING OF THE PmR-siwr, 1968 (1969); T. "Warm,
THE MLAxING OF A PRsWDENT-1968, 196-197 (1969); T. WHTE, THE ? KING or A Pnrstor-
1960, 279-95 (1961).
44. See, e.g., J. K. GALBRAII-, THE NEw INDusrRAL STATE 377 (1967).
45. The following statement is typical of this critidsm:
Far from being an expression of majority desire, as the networks say, television
programs are the imposition of a social minority on the majority, the minority con-
sisting of the fifty top advertisers, the three networks, and a dozen advertising agencies.
It is what they think public taste is and demands that governs the nature of broad-
casting.
A. KENDUCK, Pux= Tnm: THE LEE OF EmvmA R. MUROW 12-13 (1969).
1351
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 79: 1343, 1970
sues its self-interest, very narrowly conceived; it regards the public as
a collection of consumers to be exploited in the most profitable way.40
Program content is therefore shaped by this small group's
view of the tastes of a majority of the viewing public. As
Nicholas Johnson has put it, the ideas and life-styles advo-
cated by television are those which appeal to "Americans
fortunate enough to be native-born-white-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant-
suburban-dwelling-middle-class-and-over-thirty. 47
Given the concentration of ownership, many ideas are never broad.
cast, because a network official decides they are not newsworthy or lack
audience appeal or are simply inflammatory.48 Private censorship may
occur even if a controversial figure is given broadcast time, as when
Joan Baez's criticism of the draft became a bleep, or when singer Judy
Collins' critical remarks on the Chicago conspiracy trial were censored
from ABC's Dick Cavett Show. 40
The problems of broadcasting, according to this fourth argument
justifying regulation, are similar to those which plague other major
American industries. Many important activities, like air transporta-
tion, the manufacture of automobiles, the exchange of securities or
banking, take place in markets controlled by a small group of owners
46. On the relationship between advertising and programming, see Barrow, The
Attainment of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52 VA. L. REv. 633, 633-644 (1966;
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HAPV. L. REV. 1641,
1660-61 (1967).
47. Dan Sanders, 17 F.C.C. 2d 204, 211, 15 P & F RADIo Rrc. 2d 1096, 1102(b) (1969)
(Commissioner Johnson's concurring opinion).
48. Vice-President Agnew, in a speech which attracted nationwide attention, said:
We cannot measure this power and influence by traditional democratic standards for
these men can create national issues overnight. They can make or break-by their
coverage and commentary-a Moratorium on the war. They can elevate men from
local obscurity to national prominence within a week. They can reward some politi.
cians with national exposure and ignore others. For millions of Americans, til network
reporter who covers a continuing issue, like ABM or civil rights, becomes in effect,
the presiding judge in a national trial by jury.
A raised eyebrow, an inflection of the voice, a caustic remark dropped in the middle
of a broadcast can raise doubts in a million minds about the veracity of a public
official or the wisdom of a government policy.
One Federal Communications Commissioner considers the power of the networkg to
equal that of local, state and federal governments combined. Certainly, It represento
a concentration of power over American public opinion unknown in history.
By way of conclusion, let me say that every elected leader in the United States defends
on these men of the media. Whether what I have said to you tonight will be heard
and seen at all by the nation is not my decision; it is not your decision; It Is their
decision.
From a speech given in Des Moines, Iowa, November 13, 1969. Washington Post, No.
vember 14, 1969, at p. 23, col. I.
49. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1970, at p. 95, col. 1. Miss Collins later complained to the
FCC, but the Commission announced that such censorship was within the network's
discretion. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1970, at p. 83, col. 1.
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who are potentially (or actually) irresponsible. Since the 1930's the
standard response to these situations has been twvo-fold: to use anti-
trust laws to break up the concentrated control and to establish a
governmental "watchdog" agency to protect against abuses. For broad-
casting, the antitrust laws have proven insufficient to atomize private
power over radio and TV. °
Therefore, the second part of the New Deal solution-a "watch-
dog" agency-is necessary to regulate broadcasting practices and to pre-
vent the abuses caused by the lack of a competitive market. Govern-
ment, representing all the people, has no narrow or selfish interest
to protect, so it can be trusted to insure that broadcasting operates in
the public interest.51 Should government itself abuse its power, it can
be chastened through the electoral process.
The basic problem with the sophisticated version of the "public
interest theory" is its misplaced confidence in the neutrality of a gov-
ernmental agency. Government generally is unlikely to be detached
with regard to expression.52 Rather, the "government" is an enormous
50. The basic problem is that three networks dominate broadcasting. They control
program production and distribution, own the richest stations, and provide the programs
for the mass audiences. For statistics see Barnett, Cable Television and Media Concentra-
tion, Part I: Control of Cable Systems by Local Broadcasters. 22 STAN. L REV. 221, 274-277
(1970); for description of network operations, see Blake and Blum, Network Television Rate
Practices: A Case Study in the Failure of Social Control of Price Discrimination, 74 YALE
L.J. 1339, 1340-76 (1965); B. RucK.R, THE FIRST FpxEno[ 140-57 (1968); and Coldin, The
Television Overlords, ATLANTIC July, 1969, at 87.
A less important, but still serious, problem, is interlocking multiple media ownership.
See B. Rucamm, TnE FIRST FREEoDM 188-200 (1968); Johnson, The Media Barons and the
Public Interest, ATLA'rc (June 1968) at 43; Pastore, Hearings on Violence, pt. 1, 263-330
(1969) (information as of Nov., 1968, on ownership by city, by facilities owned).
Using the antitrust laws to break up networks or to linut regional or national power to
communicate where no economic power is evident, raises diflicult questions beyond the
scope of this Note. But many cities suffer a media monopoly, or near monopoly, which
appears to be within the reach of § 2 of the Sherman Act or § 7 of the Clayton Act. An
example is Cheyenne, Wyoming, whose only TV station is owned by the same company
which owns the only full-time radio station and Cheyenne's only two newspapers. At the
Justice Department's urging [see Petition for A Hearing, In Re Application of Frontier
Broadcasting Co. (December 30, 1968) (on file at the Yale Law Journal)] the Commission
recently set for hearing the application for renewal of the TV license. N.Y. Times,
February 13, 1970, at p. 75, col. 1. The least that can be said is that the Justice Deparbment
has been deferential to the FCC in the area of media concentration, and has been willing
to allow the Commission to move at its own slow pace.
51. For example, a recent student Note concluded:
The power of the mass media carries a correlative responsibility. Unfortunately,
mercenary self-censorship has led to an abdication of that responsibility. When the
private sector turns censor, it is time to trust tie public.
Note, The FCC's Fairness Regulations: A First Step Towards Creation of a Right of
Access to the Mass Media, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 294, 305 (1969) (emphasis added).
52. Not easily fooled is the foxy Governor of Georgia, Lester G. Maddox, who criti-
cized Vice-President Agnew for not going far enough in his Des Moines speech, supra
note 48. Governor Maddox said:
"The handful of men with this dreadful power of opinion.makin; also come from
areas other than the TV networks. This unprecedented concentration of power also
comes from the White House, some members of the Supreme Court, the Department
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complex of vested interests anxious about self-perpetuation and sensi-
tive to opportunities for manipulating public opinion. As government
has expanded in size and function over the last 40 years, both its desire
and its ability to influence exchanges in the 'marketplace of ideas"
have also increased. Huge direct expenditures for "information dis-
semination," coupled with easy access to the media, make it a potent
communicator. Over the same period many citizens have come to be-
lieve that it is personally dangerous to raise their voices in opposition
to official policy. Millions of people work for the state apparatus at
one level or another. Others go to schools or work for corporations
which are government financed. The official power which results can
be exercised in many ways, from overt attempts to punish unpopular
opinions to subtle pressures never openly expressed. The FCC is not
immune to political and intra-governmental pressure. The "public
interest theory" places trust in the agency as the means of counterbal-
ancing irresponsible private broadcasters even though government it-
self poses a significant threat to free speech.53
The prevalence-and dangers-of the "public interest theory" are
seen in the recent case of Red Lion v. FCC.5 4 There the Supreme
Court adopted, with minor verbal modifications, a version of the
"theory" to turn back a First Amendment attack on FCC program
regulation in general and the fairness doctrine in particular." Com-
of Health, Education and Welfare, other news-media, some members of Congress and
some big shot leaders in education and religion."
N.Y. Times, November 16, 1969, at p. 78, col. 3.
53. Professor Robinson has described how one can be lulled into ignoring the First
Amendment problems of governmental regulation in the field of broadcasting.
So long as the broadcast licensee is regarded as a monopolist who, were it not for
regulation, would be able to run free, it is he who is portrayed as the censor and not
the Commission. Indeed, the Commission can pass itself off as the champion of free
speech, dedicated to ensuring that the licensee gives the fullest expression to all pos-
sible viewpoints and addresses itself to all possible tastes. There is no doubt that the
Commission is aided in playing this role by dissatisfaction with the average quality of
programming, particularly among intellectuals who would be most likely to express
concern about infringements on free speech.
Robinson, supra note 19, at 68.
54. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
55. The personal attack rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679, had been
upheld by the lower court. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.
1967). In Red Lion, the licensee broadcast a discussion about a book by Fred Cook on the
1964 Republican Presidential Campaign. Cook, a newspaperman, had previously written
an expos6 of certain types of radio programs, asserting that the specific program at issue
was representative. During the broadcast, it was alleged that Cook had been fired for
making a false charge against an unnamed New York official. Contrary to the FCC's
personal attack policy, the licensee failed to notify Cook of the attack or furnish him
with a transcript of the program and refused Cook's request for free time to respond to
the attack. Following receipt of the complaint from Cook, the Commission issued a
letter to the licensee ruling that it had violated the personal attack rules which were a
part of the fairness doctrine. The Commission requested the licensee to advise the
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bining the public ownership and public trustee arguments, the Court
asserted that broadcasters have few or no First Amendment rights vis-
-vis the public as represented by government:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech
by radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment.
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount. 0
This approach permits the Court to reject the rather obvious prob-
lems of vagueness and of chilling effect which are created by rules the
FCC has promulgated "in the public interest."57 Rejecting these attacks
seems to be a mistake. 5 But the major shortcoming of Red Lion is the
Commission of its plans to comply with the fairness doctrine, farther requiring that Cook
be given the right of reply at no expense to Cook, unless Cook were willing to pay. In
response to the licensee's request for a ruling, the Commission affirmed the constitution-
ality of the fairness doctrine as it was applied in this situation. On appeal, the licensee
challenged the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine claiming among other things
that it violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague.
In United States v. Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n, 400 F.2d 1002 (19q, the
Seventh Circuit had held that the personal attack rules and the fairness doctrine could
be sustained against First Amendment attack only if the FCC demonstrated significant
public interest in attainment of fairness in broadcasting and that the Commission was
unable to obtain fairness by less dramatic means.
56. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
57. Id. at 392-396.
58. The Court rejected the argument that, if political editorials or personal attacks will
trigger an obligation in broadcasters to afford the opportunity for expression to speakers
who need not pay for time and whose views are unpalatable to the licensees, then broad-
casters will be irresistibly forced to self-censorship and their coverage of controversial public
issues will be eliminated or at least chilled. Although the Court stated that such a result
would indeed be a serious matter, it accepted the FCC's finding that the possibility was
speculative. In support of this finding, the Court noted that the communications industry
has taken pains to present controversial programs in the past and assumes that the indus-
try will continue to do so in the future. But the issue is not whether some controversial
programming will survive, but rather whether some will be inhibited.
To deny the inhibiting effect of regulations which require free time for opposing views
is to overlook the fundamental premise of capitalism. Broadcasters are primarily business-
men whose goal is to maximize profits; to present controversial programming is to ris a
loss of income by incurring the duty to give away air time free.
Even apart from this economic issue, it should be obvious that the fairness doctrine will
have some inhibiting effect on speech. Imagine a statute requiring that Madel)n Murray
O'Hair, or her designated representative, be notified whenever a Jehovah's Witness makes
a house call. Mrs. O'Hair would then have the right to hurry over to explain her opposing
views on religion. Such a statute would make Jehovah's Witnesses less enthusiastic about
door-to-door evangelism, and in due time fewer houses would be visited. To lessen the
effectiveness of someone's speech is to inhibit it; the Red Lion court obscured that fact by
simply accepting the FCC's finding that in the past the fairness doctrine produced no
inhibiting effect.
Also, the Court dealt with the vagueness of the two pillars of the fairness doctrine--
"controversial issue" and "fair treatment"--in a condusory fashion. (Id., at 395.)
These terms are so vague that a licensee must self-censor a broader range of programs
than the Commission deems "controversial" in order to avoid deciding whether such
programs fit a larger pattern of "fair treatment." In the same way, the licensee must give
fairer "fair treatment" than the FCC requires to be sure that the station is not forced to
give free time. It might be argued that this vagueness improves the s)stcm of fie cxpres-
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Court's blind acceptance of the notion that the government can be
installed as virtually the unrestricted regulator of the system of expres-
sion without endangering the very freedoms that system is supposed
to enhance.
Enforcement of the fairness doctrine requires the following deter-
minations by government: Was an individual program "controversial"?
If so, were opposing views "treated fairly" on the station? If not, how
much free time should be given "responsible opposing views"? It is
submitted that these determinations involve program control: the
Commission, or a reviewing Court, is telling the licensee which specific
views must be broadcast, at what times, and for how long. Although
such control amounts to less than total censorship, it should be charac-
terized as action that allows the government to determine what is
"proper" speech content. Such action is necessarily suspect in a system
of free expression and should be so treated, even by a court that ul-
timately upholds the fairness doctrine. 0
By ignoring the dangers inherent in the granting of such govern-
mental power, the Court was able to hold that government can under-
take regulatory activity in broadcasting to "promote" the public inter.
est.60 Under the "public interest" theory as developed by the FCC,
almost unrestricted governmental control is allowed by a finding that
the public interest outweighs the broadcaster's interest in non-inter-
ference. Under the Court's Red Lion standard, the same result is
reached by a finding that a certain regulation promotes the interest of
the public at large in an effective system of free expression.
The rationale of Red Lion could, for example, be used to justify
direct governmental censorship.0' Obviously, the rationale enunciated
sion; that is different from asserting, as the Court did, that the fairness doctrine may not
have an inhibiting effect on broadcasters.
59. This Note sharply questions the fairness doctrine as it has developed but does not
attempt to decide whether the doctrine should be abandoned. See pp. 1358.59.
60. The regulations promote the "First Amendment goal of producing an Informed
public . .. 95 U.S. 267, 392 (1969).
61. Direct censorship could be justified in at least two ways. First, offensive program-
ming forces many people to curtail or eliminate their use of radio and TV. To protect the
right of people to hear, the FCC should suppress those programs which offend many people,
Second, it could be argued that radio and television have an enormous and dispropor.
tionate power to communicate ideas. As the broadcast media's power has grown, other
ways of disseminating ideas have been destroyed, so that today even realloca.
don of ownership could not restore a truly diverse system of expression. Radio and tele.
vision have created one all-pervading consciousness; now that consciousness controls those
who work for or own the media. The only agent that can break into this circle is the gov.
ernment, representing the people. Direct censorship is necessary to restore the marketplace
of ideas, since the truth cannot win out in competition with the constant barrage of un-
truths broadcast by mass media. For government to do less violates the duty of the elected
representatives of the people to serve the system of free expression demanded by the
First Amendment, it could be argued.
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in the case does not require such censorship. Indeed, the Court was
careful to state that direct censorship was not at issue.02 But it must be
emphasized that Red Lion's rationale places no limit on government
action because any regulation, including direct censorship, could be
justified as necessary for promoting the public's First Amendment
rights.63
II. A New Approach to Broadcast Regulation: The Structure-Content
Distinction
A workable theory of broadcast regulation must account for a basic
tension implicit in the government's role between the necessity for some
governmental interference and the dangers of such interference to a
system of free expression. Given the scarcity of broadcast outlets and
the breakdown of the market in the broadcast industry, governmental
action is necessary to insure diversity of expression. However, every
FCC regulation has some effect on speech content. The goal of any
theory of broadcast regulation must be to protect the system of expres-
sion from the dual threat of private monopolists and overweening
government, to satisfy the need both for continued action by the gov-
ernment and for greater limitation on that action.
A first step in the development of such a theory would be to dis-
tinguish between regulations which affect the structure of the broad-
cast industry and regulations which affect program content directly.
A viable system of free expression must make the means of communi-
cation accessible to many, and allow free and uninhibited expression
of diverse views. Regulations which affect the structure of the broad-
cast industry can promote the goals of accessibility and diversity with-
out unduly impeding free expression. Other regulations which im-
pinge directly on the content of particular programs severely impede
the free presentation of ideas.
The structure-content distinction provides a standard for evaluating
FCC actions that gives proper weight to First Amendment considera-
62. 595 U.S. -67, 596 (1969).
63. A lower court has already relied on Red Lion to uphold program restrictions im-
posed by the FCC on over-the-air subscription television.
[Tihe Commission must seek to assure that the listening and viewing public will be
exposed to a wide variety of 'social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences.' [Red Lion at 290.]
The need to make choices of this kind requires the Commission to take some
cognizance of the kind and content of programs being offered to the public ....
National Ass'n of Theater Owners v. FCC, 17 P 8- F RA&io RaE. 2d 2010, 2097-8 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 922 (1970).
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tions. Regulations that provide government with the opportunity to
control content and impose its own views directly would be forbidden.
This category includes those regulations which provide government
with unlimited discretion to determine in the short-run the particular
content of what is to be broadcast. The clearest and most extreme
example is direct, uncontrolled governmental censorship. Other types
of regulation which are seemingly structural but, in fact, are directed
toward controlling particular content should also be prohibited. Ex-
amples of this type of regulation would be statutes requiring that the
FCC grant licenses only to persons loyal to the government,04 or to per-
sons not members of labor unions, or to people who are white.0
Though written in terms of industry structure, such a statute would be
a transparent attempt to control viewpoint directly.
Correlatively, those structural regulations aimed at providing greater
accessibility and increased diversity would be permitted. Such regula-
tions have only an indirect and long-term effect on particular pro-
gram content and thus are less likely to allow government to interfere
with program content. The one-to-a-customer rule,0 the policy favoring
integrated management and ownership, 7 or rules requiring a minimal
amount of non-network programming are examples.'
The many other governmental regulations that fall within the limit-
ing examples cited above present difficult problems. Such regulations
include requirements of program balance, equal time provisions, the
fairness doctrine, and minimum racial quotas on ownership.0 9 The root
problem lies in formulating for a highly concentrated industry stan.
dards of diversity and equal access which can be administered without
highly subjective government review of program content. Solutions
64. The Commission has attempted to enforce such a requirement in the past. See the
case of Edward Lamb, discussed in Brown, Character and Candor Requirements for FCC
Licenses, 22 LAw & CONTENIP. PROB. 644, 652-654 (1967) and in Commissioner Jones' dissent
in WBNX Broadcasting Co., 4 P & F RArno RiG. 242, 255-257 (1948).
In 1954, the FCC announced a proposed rule which would deny a radio license to Corn.
munists and persons of low moral character. In 1962, the Commission finally ended the
rule-making proceedings without adopting the rule. Scheibla, Air Wave Pollution,
BARRON'S, April 6, 1970, at 12, col. 3. But in 1964 the Commission announced that mner.
bership in the Communist Party was relevant to a public interest finding. Paciflca
Foundation, 86 F.C.C. 147, 1 P & F RADio RE. 2d 747, 752-3 (1961).
65. In fact, less than one tenth of 1% of broadcast stations are owned by black people.
N. JOHNSON, How To TALK BACK TO Yout Tm.EvsioN SEr 110 (1970). A recent study of
310 radio stations aimed at a black audience found that only nine were owned by Ne.
groes. New York Times, March 27, 1970, at p. 67, col. 1.
66. Supra note 21.
67. See Hi-Line Broadcasting Co., 18 P & F RADio REG. 1017, 1042 (1957), Biscayne Tele-
vision Corp., 11 P & F RADio REG. 1113, 1156 (1956).
68. Supra note 22.
69. There is no racial quota at present. See note 65 supra.
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to these difficulties will require development of more sophisticated
tests which will complement the structure-content distinction.
The formulation of the distinction is thus no more than an initial
step in adequately dealing with the free speech tension inherent in
FCC regulation.70 The benefit claimed for the approach is that regula-
tory problems are framed in terms of considerations important to a
system of free expression. By considering the nature and degree of
governmental interference with particular views, a court is less likely
to overlook the threat that government poses to free speech in the
broadcast area.
III. First Amendment Standards Should Apply To Offensive Speech
The structure-content distinction helps place current FCC practices
involving "offensive" programs in a context which emphasizes First
Amendment issues. Operating under the "public interest theory," the
FCC can freely penalize a wide range of quasi-obscene speech that the
Commission considers offensive but which would not meet the Su-
preme Court's test for obscenity were the material to appear in a
movie or newspaper. The following cases are illustrative.
In Palmetto Broadcasting, the Commission came to grips with Uncle
Charley Walker ("This is your Uncle Charley letting it hang out and
drag in the sand"), an announcer whose patter was "suggestive, vulgar
and subject to double meaning."7' The FCC recognized that Uncle
Charley's quips could not be considered obscene.72 But the narrow
standard of the relevant obscenity statute73 was not considered a limita-
70. The commended approach does not require the radical restructuring of the broad-
cast industry that may be necessary. But it would legitimize measures which structure
control over broadcast facilities in ways that assure diversity of expression, but avoid
direct imposition of government views as to what the public shall fee or hear. Examples
indude encouraging CATV; distributing licenses on a random basis amnong applicants
with minimal technical qualifications; granting more licenses to listener-supported sta-
tions; licensing some stations to serve as common-carriers with fixed rates for air-time
available on a first-come basis; granting licenses to communities which set up proce-
dures for electing a board of directors to oversee the use of the station; and limiting the
duration of licenses to five years, with no renewal. All of these actions would help
mitigate present broadcasting problems without sacrificing the value of free speech.
These and other structural reforms are viewed with horror by present broadcasters; for
them, government interference with their programs is a lesser evil, since they care more
about their license than they do about censorship. "At gunpoint, and given the choice
of 'your money or your life,' the ordinary citizen promptly yields up his money. Not so
the broadcaster." VAsumrY, March 26, 1969. at 74, col. 2.
71. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250, 23 P & F RAmo Rri. 483, 485g (192.
The Court of Appeals affirmed on grounds not related to the obscenity issue. Robinson v.
FCC, 334 F2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
72. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., supra note 71, at 485L
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1964).
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tion on the Commission's decision that "coarse and vulgar" comments,
over a period of time, violated the public interest.1 4 Hence, Palmetto's
license was not renewed.
In 1964, the Commission renewed the licenses of the Pacifica Foun-
dation. Its decision followed a sustained public controversy-including
Senate hearingsT5-about the Pacifica broadcasts of Edward Albee's
The Zoo Story, a Ferlinghetti poem, and a discussion of homosexual
ity by eight practitioners.1 6
Our function, we stress, is not to pass on the merits of the pro-
gram-to commend or to favor. Rather ... it is the very limited
one of assaying, at the time of renewal, whether the licensee's pro-
gramming, on an overall basis, has been in the public interest
and, in the context of this issue, whether he has made program-
ming judgments reasonably related to the public interest. This
does not pose a close question in this case .... 77
In spite of the favorable disposition of all charges against Pacifica,
the Commission, a year later, limited all subsequent license renewals
to one year (rather than the normal three).71
In April, 1970, the Commission imposed a forfeiture on Philadel-
phia's WUHY-FM, a noncommercial educational station, for the broad.
cast of indecent material. During an interview, broadcast from approxi-
mately 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., Jerry Garcia, leader of the Grateful
Dead, a California rock group, expressed his views on ecology, music,
philosophy, and interpersonal relations.1 The Commission found the
74. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250, 23 P & F RArno REG. 483, 485h (1962).
75. In 1963, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee held extensive hearings on
alleged Communist influence in Pacifica. The committee never issued a report. Schelbia,
Air Wave Pollution, BARRON's, April 6, 1970, at 12, col. 4.
76. The other material consisted of excerpts from "Ballad of the Despairing Husband,"
a poem by Robert Creeley, and excerpts from TnE KID, an unfinished novel by Edward
Pomerantz. Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, 1 P & F RADio REG. 2d 747, 749 (1964).
77. Id. at 751.
78. Pacifica Foundation, 6 P & F RArio REG. 2d 570 (1965). The Commission cited devia.
tions from Pacifica's program supervisory policies as the reason for the short renewal,
Id. at 571.
79. The Commission characterized the radio media as a public arena and concluded
that although a person might use the kind of language expressed in the broadcast In other
settings, "he has no right to do so in public arenas .. " Eastern Education Radio, 18 P F& F
RArno REG. 2d 860, 863 (1970). The Commission also affirmed the captive audience theory
for broadcasting:
And here it is crucial to bear in mind the difference between radio and other media.
Unlike a book which requires the deliberate act of purchasing and reading (or a
motion picture where admission to public exhibition must be actively sought) broad-
casting is disseminated generally to the public . . . under circumstances where recep-
tion requires no activity of this nature. Thus, it comes directly into the home and
frequently without any advance warning of its content.
Id. at 864. (Emphasis in original.) The Commission further noted that this type of
programming should be prohibited because of the large numbers of children In the radio
and TV audiences.
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material offensive because "his comments were frequently interspersed
with the words 'fuck' and 'shit,' used as adjectives, or simply as an in-
troductory expletive or substitute for the phrase 'et cetera'." An exam-
ple cited by the Commission were the words: "political change is so
fucking slow."810 The Commission found that it had authority to pun-
ish the broadcast of the program on two separate grounds. First it held
the broadcast "indecent" under 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which penalizes the
use of any obscene, indecent, or profane language in radio communi-
cations.81 This was the first time that the FCC had given the word "inde-
cent" a meaning independent of the word "obscene."82 Secondly, the
Commission held that this particular broadcast could be punished be-
cause it did not serve the public interest.s3
These cases hold that certain program content, although not obscene
under the federal statutes, violates the public interest. The FCC inter-
fered with particular expression and made a determination about
what is "proper" program content. Penalties resulted. By suppressing
this material, the Commission dictated what the public could see or
hear. These cases penalizing "quasi-obscenity" were decided on the
wrong grounds, since the official action should have been judged by First
Amendment standards rather than by standards developed under the
"public interest theory."
80. Id. at 861.
81. The Commission conceded that the broadcast would not necessarily come within the
standard laid down in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"
v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1965). "However, we believe that the statutory term,
'indecent,' should be applicable, and that, in the broadcast field, the standard for its ap-
plicability should be that the material broadcast is (a) patently offensive by contemporary
community standards; and (b) is utterly without redeeming social value." 18 P & F RADio
Rc. at 865. The Commission stated that the issue whether the term "indecent," has a
meaning different from "obscene" is not clear and can only be definitely settled by the
courts. Id. at 868. But for the reasons cited in footnote 79, supra, the Commission decided
that it did have a different meaning. Id.
82. "There is no precedent, judicial or administrative, for this case." rd. at 866. Compare
Jack Straw Memorial Foundation (KRAB-FM), 21 F.C.C. 2d 833, 18 P & F RADio Rro. 2d
414 (1970) (limiting license renewal to one year because of a broadcast containing four letter
words; the licensee was punished for his lack of care in failing to screen programs in
accordance with his own policy).
There is judicial precedent as to the word indecent. Statutes containing that word have
been ruled unconstitutional in Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (195)
(per curiam), cited with approval in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S.
676, 683 (1968); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 160-163 (2d Cir. 1965) ("it is doubtful
whether any standard other than obscenity could stand the constitutional test." Id., at
163); State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W2d 20, 29 (Mo. 1965).
83. Eastern Education Radio, supra note 79 at 867. The Commission imposed a for-
feiture of $100.00, stating that because the broadcast was an isolated occurrence on the
station there was no question of revocation or denial of license. However, the Commission
thought it appropriate to impose some penalty, even though minimal, to allow for court
review of the decision, since it involved certain First Amendment questions of first im-
pression, "particularly as to the Section 1464 aspect." Id. at 868.
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IV. Defining Obscenity in the Broadcast Media
Speech which courts have held to be unprotected by the First Amend-
ment can be suppressed in broadcasting as in other media. A federal
statute limited to punishing judicially-defined obscenity in broadcasting
is a better tool for dealing with the "offensive" speech problems than
the current method of regulation.84 However, difficulties arise in ap-
plying the obscenity doctrines to the broadcast setting. These difficul-
ties stem from the Supreme Court's inability to define obscenity in
other media.
To be judged obscene, material must meet each of three criteria: it
must (1) be "patently offensive," (2) be "utterly without social or liter-
ary or artistic or any other importance," and (3) appeal to "prurient
interest," i.e., "have a tendency to induce lustful thoughts."' 8 One
84. Another method of regulating quasi-obscene or offensive speech is to give the
words "indecent" and "profane" contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1964), quoted supra
note 29, a meaning independent of the word "obscene." The Commission in the Eastern
Educational Radio case, supra notes 79-81, recently utilized this approach for the first
time.
However, giving the words "indecent" and "profane" meanings independent of the word
"obscene" would raise serious constitutional porblems. Statutes containing the word
"indecent" have been ruled unconstitutionally vague in Holmby Productions, Inc. v,
Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955) per curiam, cited with approval in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 683 (1968); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 160-163 (2d Cir.
1965)-"It is doubtful whether any standard other than obscenity could stand the consti-
tutional test." id. at 163; State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W.2d 20, 29 (Mo. 1965); and Hallmark
Productions, Inc. v. Carroll 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956). Licensing standards pro'
scribing offensive material in such terms as "sacrilegious," "immoral" and "cruel" have
been struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutionally vague. Winters v. NY.,
333 U.S. 507 (1948); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Gelling v. Texas
343 U.S. 960 (1952); and Superior Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Education 346 U.S. 587 (1954),
The obscenity test has consistently escaped the vagueness condemnation on the ground
that it is a narrow exception to freedom of speech which has evolved a sufficiently clear
meaning from its long history of enforcement.
Furthermore, even if the "indecent" and "profane" language of § 1464 were not found
unconstitutional on its face, its constitutionality would probably be limited to those In-
stances in which there is a valid state interest to be protected. Williams v. District of
Columbia, 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Karp v. Collins, Civil Action No. 156.69 (D.N,J.
1970). Apparently, the only two legitimate state interests in suppressing offensive and
indecent material for adults are (1) an interest in preventing listeners from reacting phys-
ically and spontaneously, thereby causing a breach of the peace, and (2) an interest in pro.
tecting the sensibilities of individuals who did not consent to hear the offensive material.
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590-91 (1969); Williams v. District of Columbia, supra,
at 646; Karp v. Collins, supra.
These interests would not generally be applicable in situations in which offensive ma-
terial is aired over the broadcast media. The interest of the state in preventing a spon-
taneous eruption of violence (the Chaplinsky fighting words situation) is not present
because there is no physical proximity in broadcasting between the speaker and audience;
there may be a danger that the broadcast will provoke the members of the audience to
retaliate against others, but that of course would have to be shown.
The interest of the state in protecting the sensibilities of the audience-and an addi.
tional state interest, preventing indecent or profane material from reaching children-Is
dealt with, pp. 1364-66 infra, in the discussion of whether, in contrast to giving meaning
to the words "indecent" and "profane," there should be a broadening of the definition of
"obscenity" in the broadcast media.
85. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General, 383 US. 413 (1966). For discussion of the Supreme Court's development of
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question that has important implications for defining obscenity in the
broadcast setting is: what constitutes the relevant audience for de-
termining prurient interest? Most judicial definitions of obscenity
consider the "average man" the relevant audience for testing a law of
general prohibition, while allowing a different standard for statutes
limited to punishing distribution to minors. However, the Court has
not began to formulate a definition of obscenity for children.80
A second important issue is whether constitutional doctrine which
allows suppression of obscenity can be applied to other categories of
offensive speech such as violence,8 7 blasphemy, sacrilege,6s vulgarity53
and prejudice. 0 The Court has evolved no rationale to explain why
sexual imagery can be suppressed while these other kinds of offensive
materials are protected. The argument that sexual material leads to
criminal acts or personal corruption can be made equally well0t for
depictions of violence, prejudice or sacrilege .12 An argument based on
obscenity law, see generally T. EMERasoN, THm SirEm or FRFzmoss or ExPrERSlon 467-515
(1970); Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUss. L REv.
391 (1963); Kalven, Metaphysics of Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 1; Katz, Privacy
and Pornography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 Sup. Or. REv. 203; Krislow, From Ginzburg to
Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour In Obscenity Litigation, 1963 SuP. Cr. Rm,. 153;
Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 SuP. Cr. RM. 7, Note, Much Ado
About Dirty Books, 75 YAE. L.J. 1365 (1966).
86. The Court considers children to lack the mature judgment which is necessary for
exposure to a full range of ideas. See generally Ginsberg v. New York, 990 U.S. 629 (1963);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 US. 676 (1968). Cf. Rabeck v. New York 891
US. 462 (1968) (per curiam). For another kind of relevant audience problem, see Mishkin
v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-10 (1966), and United States v. Maw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d
Cir. 1965).
87. Cf., Winters v. New York, 333 US. 507 (1948).
88. Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
89. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 US. 146 (1946).
90. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930; Dan Sanders, 17 F.C.C. 2d 204, 15 P & F RA.to Roc. 2d 1096
(1969). Cf. Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 38 U.S. Lw
W=rn 2002 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'g Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 13 P & F RA o
RaG. 2d 769 (1968).
91. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), apparently refutes this argument, as applied
to adults. In that case a search of Stanley's home yielded three reels of allegedly obscene
eight-millimeter film. The majority's reversal of the state court conviction for possession
of obscene materials is based not on grounds of illegal search, but rather on the right of
privacy. In upholding the right to private possession of obscene materials, the Court rejects
or severely curtails the state's interest in regulating obscenity for the purpose of protecting
moral standards (by implication), or of controlling the moral content of a person's thoughts,
or of preventing deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence (Id., at 565.67).
Stanley would seem to leave the State only two interests in regulating obscenity: (1) pre-
venting children from obtaining obscene material and (2) protecting unwilling adults from
intrusions on their sensibilities or privacy. It is on these two grounds that the Court dis-
tinguishes Roth v. United States, 354 U.. 476 (1957). Cf. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S.
767, 769 (1967) (per curiam). For a good discussion of Stanley, see Katz, Privacy and Por-
nography: Stanley v. Georgia, 1969 Sup. CT. Rv. 203.
92. Advocacy of illegal sexual practices has been held not to justify censorship, so
such advocacy alone cannot come under obscenity laws. Kingsley Int'l Picture Corp. v.
Regents of the University of State of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 688.89 (1959).
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the concept of moral nuisance would seem to apply equally to all forms
of offensive material, whether sex is involved or not. So too the right
of the majority to pass laws punishing practices for which the commu-
nity feels moral revulsion does not distinguish sexual from other offen-
sive expression.93 Thus, although the Court has limited its definition
of obscenity to material with prurient appeal, there is at present no
theoretical barrier to expanding the definition to other offensive topics.
Such an extension might well occur in broadcasting. The FCC has
received complaints about isolated use of profanity,94 off-color jokes98
use of words with a double meaning,90 suggestive songs, or DJ patter.9
These examples and many others raise the problem of whether "of-
fensive" speech without "prurient appeal" can be constitutionally sup-
pressed. Since the Court has demonstrated its willingness to interpret
the First Amendment differently to reflect differences between media,98
the arguments in favor of encompassing more types of material within
the term obscenity as it applies to broadcasting must be considered.
First, it can be argued that TV viewers, or radio listeners, should be
considered an unwilling or captive audience when offensive matter is
presented on the air. Offensive material can be suppressed when the
alternative is to allow its imposition upon individuals against their
will. Professor Emerson believes that to shock another by offensive
verbal communication, when done intentionally, constitutes an inva-
sion of privacy.9 9 Radio and TV, according to Judge Bazelon, play to
captive audiences because escaping the set requires leaving the room,
changing the channel, or doing some other affirmative act (for example,
turning it off or falling asleep).100
93. A recent District of Columbia case holds that offensive language in public is not
actionable merely because it offends the sensibilities of passers-by. Williams v. District of
Columbia, 419 F.2d 638, 646 (1969). But ef. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590-591(1969); Karp v. Collins, Civil Action No. 756-69 (D. N.J., opinion filed March 12, 1970).
94. See, e.g., Eastern Education Radio, supra note 79; Jack Straw Memorial Foundation,
supra note 82.
95. See, e.g., cases cited at note 33, supra.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., cases cited at note 32, supra.
98. "[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, .395 U.S.
367, 386 (1969). See also Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49 (1961);
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of State of New York, 360 U.S. 684,
689-90 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
99. T. EMERSON, THE SYsTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 500.01 (1970). See Redrtp v.
New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam). Cf. Fort v. City of Miami, 389 U.S. 918 (1967):
100. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also, the FCC brief
submitted in Grove Press v. Christenberry, reported 25 Fed. Reg. 7292, 7293 (1960):
"[R]adio and TV programs enter the home and are readily available not only to the
average adult but also to children and to the emotionally immature .... Thus, for
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The captive audience argument for regulation of offensive program-
ming can be met by requiring a system of warnings more or less like
those used for movies. The Pacifica station KPFK-FM warned through-
out the broadcast day that an offensive poem would be read at a cer-
tain time. 01 Such a warning would not reach a person who tuned into
a program just before the offensive material was broadcast and was
thus captive. But it can be argued that the position of such a person
is similar to the position of one who suddenly confronts offensive
words or pictures while reading through a book or turning the pages
of a magazine. Further, a warning could be given intermittently
during the broadcast itself. If proper warnings are given, the captive
audience problem is not arguably different in broadcasting than in
other media, and thus the existence of the problem cannot justify dif-
ferent standards of obscenity. The cost of protecting from shock those
few unsuspecting viewers or listeners who are not reached by warnings
is simply too high-much controversial material would have to be cen-
sored so as not to offend the unwary.
A second argument for more thoroughgoing government censorship
under a special obscenity standard for broadcasting is that broadcasters,
unlike book sellers or theater owners, cannot prevent offensive material
from reaching innocent children. Minors watch an enormous amount
of television and are an important segment of the radio audience. Jus-
tice Stewart stated in Ginsberg v. New York that a child is like a cap-
tive listener or viewer since he does not have full capacity for individ-
ual choice. 02 Stricter standards of obscenity can therefore he applied
for minors, just as voting rights or the ability to marry can depend on
age.103 But as noted above, 04 the Court has not defined what is "ob-
scene" for minors.
In practice, any definition must blend adult norms with prevailing
theories of child development and socialization. A notable example is
the statute in Ginsberg forbidding the sale to minors of a book or pic-
ture which (i) "predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or
morbid interest of minors"; (ii) "is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is
example, while a nudist magazine may be within the protection of tie First Amend-
ment... [t]he televising of nudes might well raise serious questions of programming
contrary to 18 U.S.C. 1464 ......
101. See note 2, supra.
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suitable material for minors"; and (iii) "is utterly without redeeming
social importance for minors."'105
Yet concern for the large number of minors who comprise radio and
TV audiences does not necessarily justify an expansion of the obscenity
test in broadcasting. Of equal concern is the spirit of the command in
Butler v. Michigan that government cannot "reduce the adult popula-
tion.., to reading only what [is] fit for children ... ."101 It is necessary
to strike a balance between society's interest in controlling the pro.
grams heard or seen by children and the interest of the adult members
of society in having access to the widest possible range of broadcast
material. One way to lessen the conflict might be to require broad.
casters to make all possible efforts to minimize the number of children
in the audience for programs that present quasi-obscene and other of-
fensive material but to apply the standard obscenity test to the material
itself. Warnings and late night programming could reduce the number
of minors in the audience, but of course such precautions do not com-
pletely solve the problem of a juvenile audience. At some point, how-
ever, parents must bear the major responsibility for controlling what
their children see and hear. To place the responsibility on the licensee
might make TV a marvelous medium for children, but the cost would
be to subject adults to programs suitable only for juveniles.
Finally, it can be argued that the great impact of radio and TV justi-
fies giving unusually broad effect to those obscenity laws which apply
to broadcasting. This argument is similar to the impact argument used
to justify broadcast regulation. To say that material which would
not be considered obscene in a book or movie should be so considered
in radio and TV is to assume that the First Amendment becomes less
applicable as the media's impact becomes more powerful. As noted
before, such an assumption ignores the threat posed by government
interference to the system of free expression.
Nonetheless, in the future, courts may adopt a less restrictive ob-
scenity test for radio and TV for the reasons just discussed. For exam-
ple, the immature audience rationale may be used to characterize the
average man of the obscenity formula as an "average" child. The ef-
fects of a broadened obscenity test might differ very little from appli-
cation of the public interest standards with respect to suppression of
offensive programming. A lengthy First Amendment argument would
105. N.Y. Penal Law § 484-h, subsection 1(t)(i)(ii) and (iii) (McKinney 1965),
106. 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 105 (1964).
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then have been made to protect offensive programming from the effects
of the "public interest theory" of regulation, only to have such pro-
gramming censored almost as effectively by the use of a redefined ob-
scenity standard.
However, even if the courts were to interpret the obscenity standards
broadly, some progress could be claimed. When the FCC makes the
initial decision about offensive speech, regulation under the obscenity
laws will require the Commission to justify its decision in a manner
more amenable to judicial review than is the case under the "public
interest theory." At present, the reviewing court has no standard for
rejecting the FCC's finding in the licensing decision except unreason-
ableness. 07 Experience with the reasonableness test in broadcasting
has proved its worthlessness, at least where important values are in
conflict.
In conclusion, the Pacifica Foundation broadcasts should be re-ex-
amined in the ligHt of the foregoing analysis. If the restrictive ob-
scenity standard used in other media is applied to broadcasting, then
none of these broadcasts was obscene. They fail to satisfy all three
tests of the obscenity definition, each of which must be independently
met. 08 First, if the relevant audience is realistically defined as includ-
ing the poor, the young, radicals, and other groups besides the mid-
dle-aged, white middle class, the broadcasts may not meet the "patent
offensiveness" criterion.10 9 Second, although expletives and words de-
scribing sexual acts are used in some broadcasts, this language may
not appeal to prurient interest in the context in which it was used.
107. Refusal to grant or renew a broadcast license on the grounds of previous presenta-
don of objectionable programming is arguably a prior restraint. It is at least analogous.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned of the dangers to free expression of permitting
non-judicial bodies to issue prior restraints on speech. Tietel Film Corp. v. Cusack-, 390
U.S. 139 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
872 U.S. 58 (1963); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 426 (1957). Tiefel Film and
Freedman hold that when non-judicial bodies make the initial decision, there must be
speedy and complete judicial review. Compare Carroll v. Commissioners of Princess Anne,
393 U.S. 175 (1968).
108. The poem, "Anti-Semitism," was held to be protected expression in Dan Sanders,
17 F.C.C. 2d 204, 15 P & F RADio Rro. 2d 1096 (1969). The Justice Department notified
the FCC that Jehovah's Child did not warrant prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1964).
Letter from William Session, Chief, Government Operations Section, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice, to Henry Geller, FCC General Counsel, October 22, 1969, published
in Hearings on S. 2004, pt. 2, at 355.
109. Commissioner Johnson, dissenting in Eastern Educational Radio, 18 P & F RADIo
RE. 2d 860, 872d (1970) observed:
What this Commission condemns today is not words, but a culture-a life-style it fears
but does not understand- . . . What the Commission decides, after all, is that the
swear words of the lily white middle class may be broadcast, but those of the young.
the poor, or the blacks may not.
Id. at 872d, 872e. See also A. MONTAGu, THm ANATOtY OF SWEAPJNG (1967).
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Most clearly of all, the broadcasts fail to meet the third criterion of
being "utterly without social or literary or artistic value or any other
importance." They all involve controversial social and political issues.
Assuming that rules regarding warnings and late night programming
would be applied in the future, broadcasts similar to these should
not fall within the obscenity exception to the First Amendment.
Their suppression is inconsistent with a system of free expression.
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